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Who Pays for Health Care Reform?
Susan Giaimo
THE extraordinary post-war boom came to an abrupt halt in the mid1970s. The sluggish economic growth that followed ushered in a critical reexamination of the purposes and performance of the welfare state in all
advanced industrialized societies. While social policy during the 'Golden Age'
had aimed at expanding the scope and generosity of the welfare state and
thereby redistributing the fruits of economic growth, by the 1980s and 1990s,
'retrenchment' had become the watchword. For many policy makers, business
leaders, and research institutes, the welfare state had become synonymous with
high costs and deteriorating economic performance. In their view, welfare state
reform was critical to successful national or industry adjustment to tougher
economic conditions (Pfaller, Gough, and Therborn 1991 ; OECD 1994d).
T he 'new politics of the welfare state'• has also altered the relative position of various welfare state stakeholders. The views of those who finance
the welfare state have steadily gained influence in policy debates, while those
who provide and receive social benefits have increasingly found themselves
on the defensive. gmployers and government policy makers, and their interest i£1 cost containment,_.have becqm~.~-dtiviug•.(QIQ.e behind welfare state
reform.
till, the project of containing welfare state outlays has been controversial. Such projects not only threaten the prerogatives of entrenched constituencies who benefit from social programmes (Pierson 1994), but also raise
fundamental distributional concerns. Welfare states, after all, have sought
to protect the vulnerable from the vagaries of the market (Polanyi 1944
[1957]: ch. 14). The critical questions surrounding the new politics of the
welfare state, then, are whether payers' and policy makers' cost-containment
projects have succeeded, and if so, whether the price of success has been the
sacrifice of equity and solidarity. Have the burdens of welfare state reform
and economic adjustment disproportionately fallen upon the shoulders of
the weakest members of society, or have countries found ways to share this
pain in a just fashion?
1

The phrase is taken from Pierson ( 1996).

Who Pays for Health Care Reform?

335

This chapter explores these questions through the lens of health care reform
in Britain, Germany, and the United States since the late 1980s. Each country- has a distinctive health care system. And each country undertook major
reform initiatives designed to control health care outlays. Thus, Britain's
National H~alth Service (NHS) is the model of a universal, state-administered
health care system financed by general revenues; Germany has a statutory
national insurance programme financed by employers and employees; while
· the USA relies primarily on voluntary, employment:.based, fringe benefits to
cover the majority of the workforce. Public programmes play a·smaller role,
covering only specified categories of the population. Looking at three different health care systems permits us to explore whether countries have
converged on a common reform response in spite of their institutional variations, or whether institutional and political differences continued to shape
reform paths in specific ways.
As this chapter will show, the three countries addressed the effi.ciency
and equity goals in markedly different ways. Britain and Germany thus far
have achieved good cost performance without surrendering the principle
of universal access and without requiring the most vulnerable members of
society to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment. Indeed,
Britain's record on cost containment has been the best of the three cases.
While the price has been explicit rationing of access to hospital care, Britain
has done so in ways that address equity. Germany represents an intermediate case between Britain and the USA, spending more than the former
but without resorting to the gaping inequities of the latter. The USA has
only recently enjoyed markedly slower increases in health care outlays. But
the cost-containment gains have come at the expense of worsening access
to care for the sicker and poorer in society.
The reasons for these very different outcomes lie in the actions and
preferences of payers and the state in each country. Specifically, payers'
capacities to follow cost-containment strategies that were inimical to equity
and solidarity depended on the health care system in which they found
themselves, the political system and whether it provided them an avenue to
influence health policies, and their own organizational capacity to pursue
a unified, coheren.t line of action. In addition, because state actors had different roles in health care governance, they had varying expectations and
capacities to ensure that cost-containment projects were compatible with
equity. In brief, the universal health care systems of Britain and Germany
blocked cost-containment strategies by payers or government actors that would
have sacrificed equity, while the private, voluntary fringe benefits system of
the United States, encouraged employers and insurers to take cost-cutting
actions that worked in the direction of desolidarity.
The rest of the chapter proceeds along the following lines. Section 1 provides a broader background to situate the contemporary politics of health care
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reform. It explains how and why health care systems in Western countries
have come under the stress of increasing cost pressures even as governments
·. and employers have become more apprehensive about the possible effects
of the welfare state on economic competitiveness. Section 2 develops the
argument in greater depth. It explains how existing health care and political systems provide different opportunities or constraints for payers and
the state to pursue unilateral cost-containment strategies, how health care
institutions themselves shape policy preferences and strategies of payers, and
how some systems require compromise solutions that reconcile equity with
efficiency. Section 3 presents each country's case. The concluding section
considers the broader lessons from health care reform for the contemporary
politics of welfare state adjustment.
1. TO SPEND MORE OR TO SPEN D LESS?
COMPETING PRESSURES ON HEALTH
CARE SYSTEMS

Payers' anxieties over rising health care costs are not unfounded. In general,
health care has consumed a large and growing portion of social spending
in all advanced industrialized societies, particularly in the past two decades.
Beginning in the 1970s, health care systems experienced a 'cost explosion'
that had the misfortune of coinciding with the global economic slowdown
and concomitant worries about the fiscal viability of the welfare state.
However, our three countries did not fare identical1y. Britain has consistently been a low spender on the NHS when compared to its peers in the
OECD. And having experienced a cost surge in the mid-1970s, Germany
largely regained control over its health care outlays in the 1980s. The USA
has had the greatest appetite for health care and remains at the top of the
world league in health care spending (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). The spending disparities are even more remarkable when one considers that both
Britain and Germany have been able to extend access to care to the entire
population while the USA has not.
Some of the reasons for escalating health care costs are, to varying degrees,
common to all Western countries. First, the health sector is fertile ground for
technological innovations that may prolong life but at considerable expense.
In addition, once these discoveries are made, it is difficult- though not
impossible- for insurers or governments to limit their diffusion, as patients
demand access to such treatments (see Weisbrod 1985). Second, the populations of Western countries are graying, with direct consequences for health
care. Older persons are likely to experience acute illnesses requiring high-tech
interventions, or, more often, chronic conditions entailing long-term care.
Both types of care do not come cheaply. At the same time, birth rates have
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Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
. 1985
1990
1991
1992
19.93
1994
1995
1996
1997
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ll.l. Health care spending as a percentage ofGDP, 1960- 97 -

Britain

Germany

United

3.9
4.1
4.5
5.5
5.6
5.9
6.0
6.5
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.7

4 .8
4.6
6.3
8.8
8.8
9.3
8.7
9.4
9.9
10.0
10.0
10.4
10.5
10.4

5.2
5.9
7.3
8.2
9. 1
10.6
12.6
13.4
13.9
14.1
14.1
14.1
14.0
14.0

Sta~es

Source: OECD. Health Data (1998).
TABLE

11.2. H ealth care spending per capita, 1960-97 ( $/exchange rate)

Year

Britain

Germany

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

54
76
99
229
537
472
1,024
I, 129
1,252
I , 112
1,2 13
1,313
1,358
1,457

48
78
149
467
9 13
743
1,650
2,018
2,433
2,350
2,533
3,080
3,017
2,677

United States
149
212
357

605
1,086
1,798
2,799
3,035
3,276
3,468
3,628
3,767
3,898
4,090

Source: OECD , Health Data (1998).

failed to keep pace with increasing longevity, so that there will be fewer
working-age persons in the future to shoulder the financial obligations
associated with caring for their elders. Third, the health sector is a huge
generator of service sector employment. But jobs in this sector tend to be
labour-intensive and have lower productivity than the manufacturing jobs
they are replacing. If Iversen and Wren ( 1998) are correct, the smaller growth
rates associated with the shift to a post-industrial economy will only make
the question of adequate financing of health care that much worse.
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Some of the causes for health care inflation, however, rest with the specific
design of health care systems in individual countries. Fee-for-service arrangements for paying health care providers tend to be more inflationary than
salary or capitation. The lack of a national budgeting mechanism to contain
overall health care outlays is likely to produce cost-shifting rather than effective cost containment. Health care ·systems with multiple insurers tend to have
higher administrative.costs than single-payer systems. Some countries lack
effective mechanisms to control the supply of specialists and hospitals and
patients' access to them. Each of our countries has addressed (or failed to
address) these issues in different ways. Section 3 addresses the particular
problems they faced and their specific methods for dealing with them.
Regardless of their relative success or failure in ensuring cost discipline,
governments or employers in the three countries believed that health care
outlays posed immediate and long-term problems, and began to search for
ways to address them. The reasons for such concerns are twofold. First, the
developments exerting pressure to spend more on health care services have
come at a time when economic growth has slowed from its historic post-war
levels. This has raised concerns over how to finance current and future commitments in social spending, that is, whether mature welfare states can and
will remain affordable. But the second concern has to do with the welfare state's
impact on broader economic performance. While the exact date differed in
each of our countries, from the 1980s and into the 1990s, the welfare state
became inseparable from the question of national and firm-level adjustments
to a more integrated and competitive world economy. In these debates, the
welfare state was painted as a drag on or impediment to economic adjustment,
and the solution seemed to be retrenchment measures of various sorts. 2
Whether or how the welfare state has actually hurt economic performance may be open to question, but the change in the terms of political debate
cannot be denied. The welfare state's impact on economic performance has
become one of the most discussed topics among policy makers and academics,
and has even spilled over into broader public discussions in Western
H owever, different kinds of health care systems and welfare states appear to have different vulnerabilities in a more competitive and integrated economic environment. Where social
provision is tied to employment, then the cost of fringe benefits or social insurance contributions has a direct impact on labour costs. Many analysts and employers recognize that high
non-wage labour costs ·have adverse effects on employment, especially at the low end of the
labour market (Scharpf 1997b). In voluntary fringe benefits systems, the problem of free-riding
is rampant, and may place firms that provide benefits at a competitive disadvantage. Welfa re
states financed from general revenues can avoid saddling firms with higher labour costs.
But they may present their own particular difficulties. Governments may have to raise taxes
to levels that voters find intolerable, or choose to run expensive deficits and debts to cover
spending commitments (see Genschel 1999; Pierson, Ch. 3 in this volume). If they opt for
deficits, then governments run the risk of punishment by international financial markets, or
exclusion from membership in regional economic clubs like Europe's single currency.
2
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countries. Concomitantly, payers' concerns over cost containment -have carried greater weight in social policy debates than in previous decades.

2. THE ARGUMENT: PAYERS AND THE POLITICS
OF H EALTH CARE REFORM

By the end of the 1980s, the terms of debate, the goals, and the relative power
of different actors had shifted. Cost containment had become a priority
of health policy, and the question of economic competitiveness cast a long
shadow over the calculations of policy makers and employers alike. Still, in
some countries, the politics of health care reform required employers and
state actors to forge negotiated settlements that accepted some cost control
pain in exchange for equity gains (see also Bonoli, in this volume; Rhodes,
in this volume). In other countries, however, such exchanges were absent,
and the pursuit of cost control came at the expense of equity.
To explain these different outcomes, we must know who the payers were,
what they wanted from health care reform, and what they were able to achieve
in that regard. Whether payers were employers or the state, their policy preferences depended on whether they viewed the existing health care system as
a help or a hindrance to their broader strategies of economic competitiveness. Furthermore, each country's health care system either granted
or denied employers, insurers, or the state opportunities to take unilateral
action to contain their own health care outlays at the expense of other stakeholders. In addition, the political arena provided different avenues for payers and other stakeholders to influence the course of health policy. Formal
political institutions, contingent electoral outcomes, and the organizational
characteristics of interest groups representing critical stakeholders worked
to produce a particular brand of health care politics in each country.
The most critical variable, however, was whether the health care system was
a universal, statutory system or not. If a country's health care system legally
guaranteed a universal right to health services, then it placed serious constraints on unilate·ral cost-cutting strategies by either the state or employers.
Such systems created broad constituencies or other countervailing actors
to check employers' or governments' efforts at one-sided cost-shifting. The
critical role of employees or taxpayers in financing or administering health
care programmes granted them as much legitimacy as policy makers or
employers in health care reform debates, while the political system provided
them additional means of influence over the content of reform policies. In
addition, because universal health care systems institutionalized equity and
redistribution in their core design (see Stone 1993: 292), they made efforts
to shift the burden of cost containment on to those least able to shoulder
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it politically difficult; such attempts were viewed as morally unjust. But while
universal systems placed a heavy obligation on state actors to guarantee their
solida.rity, they also granted the latter the means to govern the behaviour
of health care actors to ensure their compliance with both efficiency and
equity. Voluntary fringe benefits systems, by contrast, contained none of
these mechanisms or countervailing actors to constrain the behaviour of
employers or insurers. If anything, it was government actors who found their
freedom of manoeuvre and their authority over private actors in the health
care system severely circumscribed. The three countries help elaborate the
different parts of the argument.
First, each country's health care system designated different actors as
payers and provided them with different capacities to realize their costcontainment goals. Thus, in Britain's National Health Service (NHS), the
state is responsible for financing and providing health care. Its status as
a single payer would seemingly grant the state unlimited freedom to decide
health policy. But in fact there are limits: the state must answer to taxpayers
who ultimately finance the health care budget. In Germany, employers and
employees have equal responsibility for financing and administering national
health insurance. Because both employers and unions are firmly embedded
in these arrangements, it is difficult for one side to take unilateral action
against the other. In addition, the statutory nature of health insurance closes
off the option of 'exit' by employers, since they must provide insurance
to their workers. In the USA, employers have been the pivotal players and
payers in the politics of health care reform because most Americans obtain
health insurance as a company-based fringe benefit. At the same time,
employers are free to provide or withhold fringe benefits, since these are
voluntary. And since employees and unions lack an institutionalized role
in health insurance financing or administration, they have not been able to
mount an effective opposition to employers' cost-cutting strategies. Lastly,
many employers have viewed government efforts to intervene in the private
fringe benefits system as an illegitimate intrusion in corporate governance.
- econd, in addition to the health care system, the political arena has
offered payers an alternative or complementary channel of influence over
the course of health care reform. In Britain, taxpayers have two means of
influence. One is the ballot box, which, admittedly, is a blunt instrument
wielded infrequeJ)tly. But the other is through members of parliament
who regularly grill the government on the performance of the NHS. These
accountability mechanisms partially offset the tendency towards a politics
of imposition that the centralized political system encourages. In Germany,
both employers and employees have found the various political parties
to be willing advocates for their views. Coalition governments and parties
associated with specific health care clients have made compromise and the
balancing of the countervailing interests of employers and employees the
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norm in health politics. Federalism, too, has sometimes provided health
care actors with an additional means of influence. In the USA, the fragmented
political system-especially separation of powers- b as provided employers
ample o ppo rtunities or ' veto points' (lmmergut 1992; Steinmo a nd Watts
1995) to influence the course of health care legislation. But while they may
be good a t wielding the veto, employers have been hampered in their ability
to take positive, unified actio n by their organizationa l fragmentation in the
political arena. In fact, the business 'community' is a misnomer that masks
the reality of competing peak associations with few if any sanctions over
wayward members. As D avid Vogel ( 1978) has pointed out, most business
leaders tend to think of policy questions in t~rm s of the interests of their
own firm rather than o f th e business community as a who le. The weakness
of American business as a co llective actor in the political a rena mirrors the
autonomy of individua l enterprises and the multiple cost-cutting options
available to them in a private, voluntary fringe benefits system.
Third, statutory, universal programmes make the pursuit of cost containment at the expense of equity difficult, while voluntary fringe benefits
systems do not. One reason fo r this is that universal systems create broad
constituencies with a stake in preserving the quality and comprehensiveness of benefits. To put it bluntly, middle-class beneficiaries find themselves
in the same risk commu nity as the poor, but their reasons for fighting to
protect these programmes from retrenchment may arise from simple selfinterest rather than out of any sense of justice or altruism towards the less
fortunate. Add to this the reality that the middle a nd upper classes tend to
be more active in poli tics tha n the poor (though this is truer in the USA
than in other countries), then the risk of electora l retributio n for major
retrenchment is high. M oreover, universal programmes carry legitimacy in
the public eye because the majority of beneficiaries m ake some sort of contribution to them, either through payroll deductions to social insura nce or
through general revenues to finance a national health service. Benefits ta ke
on the status of entitlement based on contributions. Indeed , in some countries, courts have ruled th at benefits are akin to property rights to be safeguarded by law (~ee Myles and Pierson, in this volume). Thus; the political
risks a re high for governments that launch retrenchment policies tha t
appear to threaten the entitlements of a formidable ra nge of sta keholders.
However, universal health care programmes go well beyond an appea l
to self-interest or enti tlement based on past contributions. ln fact, they a re
the most redistributive of social insurance progra mmes, creating broad
solidarities that encompass equ ity and that protect the more disadva ntaged
members of society. Unlike pensions and unemployment insurance programmes, in which benefits are calculated on the basis of past contributions
and earnings, the universal health care programmes in Britain and Germany
incorporate substan tia l redistribution through the pooling of risks. They
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involve cross-subsidies from richer to poorer, younger to older, healthier to
sicker, men to women (Hinrichs 1995; Stone 1993: esp. 290- 2). And despite
differences in their institutional arrangements, the health care systems in both
countries approach Marshall's (1963) ideal of social citizenship, whereby each
person has a right to a decent social minimum as a necessary precondition
for full participation and membership in the larger community. 3 In both Britain
and Germany, definitions of social citizenship and a decent social minimum
have been generously drawn to mean that every person has a right to the same
level of high-quality care, based on one's medical need, not on one's ability
to pay or past contributions. By contrast, two-tiered systems of provision
based on ability to pay, which grant generous services for the wealthy and only
residual benefits for the poor, violate the universality and comprehensiveness
of social citizenship and their associated notions of equity.
In short, the universal health care systems of Britain and G ermany
equate equity with equality. E quity is defined as a broad solidarity, in which
the p oor and sick have the same status as the wealthy and healthy. This
equation derives from the ideas of mutuality and reciprocity that underpin
social insurance: people identify with each other in recognizing that they
aJl sh are a risk of becoming ill or incapacitated , and respond by pooling
their risk s against this vulnerability (Baldwin 1990; Stone 1993). In doing
so, universal programmes incorporate equity by extending their reach to
include the disadvantaged with the better off and tying them together in a
common fate: Put another way, these programmes achieve the goal of equity
by ' targeting within universalism' (Skocpol 1991).4 The institutionalization
3
Baldwin ( 1990) points out that universalistic, tax-financed programmes are more solidaristic because they consider the nation as the risk pool, while social insurance programmes
segment risk pools a long class, occupational, or regional lines. However, even in Germany's
national insurance programme, the broader conception of solidarity has taken root. In the
past two decades, the state has mandated that the sickness fund s offer approximately
simila r benefits (on the basis that all are entitled to medically necessary care). And the 1993
reforms introduced a fina ncial risk-pooling scheme among blue-collar and white-collar fund s
(see below and also Giaimo and Manow 1999).
4
The debate between universal and targeted programmes as a more effective and efficient
way to address the problems of the disadvantaged is not new. Skocpol echoes past advocates
of universal programmes by arguing that such arrangements better address the needs of the
poor because they have broader political support and higher levels of fundi ng that residual
programmes lack. Thus, she calls for universal rather than targeted programmes as the best
way to meet the needs of the disadvantaged. Titmuss saw the dilemma between targeted and
universal programmes as a key challenge of modern welfare states. However, he supported
selective benefits targeted to needy groups in addition to universal programmes. In his eyes,
a broader framework of universalism and a language of social rights were prereq uisites to
for ta rgeted programmes to escape stigma. A universal framework was need ed because
it 'provides a general system of values and a sense o f community; ... sees welfare, not as a
burden, but as complementary and as an instrument of change and, ... allows positive d iscriminatory services to be provided as rights for categories of people and for classes of need
in terms of priority social areas and other impersonal classifications' (Titrouss 1987b: 154).
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of risk-sharing behaviour through social insurance thereby reinforces values
.o f sharing and community among the population. Universal programmes
thus rest on multiple bases of legitimacy that are broadly shared- from
a notion of justice grounded on one's full inclusion in the community of ·
social citizenship, through ideas of reciprocity and mutualism, to simple
self-interest in preserving one's own entitlements- that together prove quite
resistant to challenges of retrenchment. 5
With social insurance, then, self-interest is compatible wi.th reciprocity
and pooling of risks. But self-interest can just as easily be conceived of in
narrower terms, as 'one gets what one pays for'. This expresses the logic
of actuarial fairness practised by private insurers. Actuarial fairness maintains that those who are healthier have no obligation to cross-subsidize
those who are sick. Rather, insurance premiums should only reflect one's
expected or actual use of health care. In practice, this kind of 'justice'
encourages aJI sorts of inequities. Private commercial insurers, following the
dictates of profit maximization and actuarial fairness, segment the market,
'cream skim' the healthier and wealthier patients, since they are the least
costly to insure, and shun the unprofitable, expensive cases, namely, the sicker
and poorer (Stone 1993). In sum, and in contrast to Britain and Germany,
the private and voluntary nature of employee fringe benefits in the USA produces rampant inequities. Both employers and insurers are free to 'opt out'
and refuse to cover the poorer and sicker on the grounds of competitiveness
or profit.
Finally, statutory universal programmes and private fringe benefits systems
affect state actors' freedom of manoeuvre as much as that of employers.
In universal systems, the state has the legal obligation to guarantee that
all citizens have access to comprehensive health care. This obligation holds
not only in a nationalized health service like Britain's, where the state is the
payer, but also in a social insurance system like Germany's, where the state
is not. Such obligations have set political limits to how far governments could
push retrenchment and whether they could do so in ways that burdened the
most vulnerable. But at the same time, the statutory systems of Britain and
Germany have provided governments with the legal authority and institutional means to set the parameters of the system and ensure that health
care actors' quest for cost control did not destroy equity and solidarity. The
government in London could use the hierarchical administrative apparatus
s Social insuranc~ programmes might also incorporate (or least be compatible with) other
motives or norms besides self-interest or mutual obligations and rights. Such programmes
might also reflect a belief that in a civilized society, the stronger members have a responsibility to help the weaker, which would be expressions of paternalism or altr uism. Nevertheless,
Baldwin ( 1990) rightly points out that social insurance rooted in reciprocity removes the stigma
and dependence of charity and instead accords benefits based on social rights or equal status
in the risk community.
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in the NHS to shape the pace and content of its reform programme in implementation, while the federal government in Germany could mandate new
implementation tasks and rules on public-law bodies of insurers, providers,
employers, and employees. But in the private employer-based health insurance system of the United States, government actors were denied the legal
authority and the institutional linkages to prevent employers and insurers
from following a range of go-it-alone cost-containment strategies that have
burdened the weaker members of society. Businesses and insurers have
viewed government efforts to regulate the health care system as an illegitimate intrusion in their private domain, while the peculiarities of regulatory
federalism have militated against coherent government action in this area.
The experiences of health care reform in Britain, Germany, and the
United States presented below bear out these conclusions.

3. THE CASES
Britain: The Limits of Neoliberal Reform in a Universal
Health Care System

In Britain's NHS, the state plays a predominant role in financing and
providing health care. Health care is financed from general revenues and
the central government determines the NHS budget. The state owns the
hospitals and governs the health service through successive tiers of heath
authorities emanating from the Department of Health (DOH) at the
centre. At the same time, state managers have shared authority in health
care governance with the medical profession, granting the British Medical
Association (BMA) an important role in policy making and administration (Giaimo 1994, 1995). British governments have also relied on hospital
doctors to ration scarce resources through waiting lists for non-emergency
hospital services. This amounted to an 'implicit concordat' with the medical
profession, whereby doctors took on the unpleasant task of rationing and
agreed to refrain from questioning governments' budgetary decisions; in
exchange, policy makers did not question their clinical freedom (Day and
Klein 1992: 471; Klein 1989: 235).
Britain's health care reform debates in the 1980s and 1990s were not couched
in terms of high labour costs because the NHS was financed from general
revenues rather than payroll taxes. And Britain had a very respectable record
of cost containment. Its fiscal discipline·owed to global budgeting of health
care and limiting the-number of hospital beds and specialist physicians. The
NHS also relied on general practitioners to act as gatekeepers to hospital
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and specialist care, and rationed elective surgical and hospital procedures by
. means of waiting lists based on medical need.6
Still, the costs and effects of the welfare state on Britain's economic health
remained an issue for Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher's disdain for the health
service reflected her neoliberal distrust of 'big government' and collectivist
politics generally, both of which she saw as responsible for Britain's economic
decline.7 And containing health care outlays was part of her broader agenda
· to bring public spending under control (Harrison 1988: ch. 5) and unleash
private economic initiative to bring about Britain's economic regeneration.
Thatcher thus subjected the NHS to a severe austerity regimen throughout the 1980s. 8 But as Klein ( 1995) observed, the Prime Minister's success
in holding down health care spending exacted a high political cost, provoking a bitter public quarrel with Parliament, health policy experts, and the
medical profession. As wa iting lists grew and hospitals closed wards and
cancelled operations, cri tics charged that the government's 'underfunding'
policy was starving the health service of needed funds, charges which only
fuelled public fears that the NHS was not 'safe in the Conservatives' hands'. 9
Thatcher countered that inefficiencies in delivering health care, rooted in
unaccoun table doctors and managers eager to defer to them, were responsible for the burgeon ing waiting lists. But with public criticism mounting, she
initiated a full-scale review of the N HS in 1988.
The political system and the policy making process offered her the
luxury to consider a range of radica l proposals and to enact her reforms
with relative ease. First, the review was a secretive a ffair involving Thatcher,
a few trusted advisers, and outsiders whose political views mirrored her own.
It was a break from the roya l commissions of her predecessors, which had
included all relevant interests. Second, party discipline and a huge parliamentary majority reassured Thatcher that her legislation would be enacted
by Parliamen t.
But even with these political advantages, Thatcher discovered that there
were limits to her reform ambitions, at least on the question of radically
6
However, Aaron and Schwartz ( 1984) found that some proced ures were rationed on social
grounds rather than strictly clinica l criteria.
7
For the neoliberal critique of Britain's decline and accounts of the rise of the New Right
in Britain, see Gamble 1994: ch. 2; Jenkins 1987; and D. Kavanagh 1990: esp. chs. 3 and 4.
According to neoliberals, 'big government' and 'special interests· stifled individual initiative
and economic growth. ln Thatcher's eyes, the NHS epitomized these twin evils: it was a sprawling p ublic bureaucracy full of rigidities, dominated by a medical profession unacco untable
to elected officials, managers, and consumers.
8 N HS spending increased 3% per year in the 1980s. But this rate was much lower than
in previous decades and below what health care experts considered sufficient to keep up with
technological advances, population ageing, and medical need (Ham, Robinson, and Benzeval
1990: 12- 14; Klein 1995: 142).
9 F or an account of the health care debates in the 1980s, see Klein 1995 and Giaimo 1994.
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transforming the financing arrangements for health care. The review team
considered but rejected radical proposals for compulsory national insurance
or mandatory private insurance on the grounds that the economic and political costs would have been prohibitive: both of these options would have
done far worse in controlling health care costs than the centralized budgets
and administrative simplicity of the single-payer NHS. And for all its shortcomings, the NHS was the most popular element of the British welfare state.
Thatcher gauged that dismantling it would have only invited the retribution
of voters (Timmins 1995: 392- 4; 453-65). 10 In addition, national insurance
would have shifted the cost of health care onto employers and almost
certainly provoked their opposition. And it would have undercut her strategy to attract inward investment and aid industry competitiveness through
low labour costs.
With privatization off the table, Thatcher decided that she would instead
bring the market into the NHS itself. Hence, the 1989 White Paper called
for an ' internal market' in the NHS, which split purchasers from providers.
NHS hospitals were granted independence from district health authorities
(DHAs). But hospitals now had to compete with each other and with the
private sector for the patients of DHA purchasers or those of general practitioner fundholders. Fundholders were large, office-based, primary care
physician practices that accepted a budget to purchase certain diagnostic
and elective hospital procedures for their patients for which long waiting lists
existed. In addition to the market reforms, the government also granted NHS
managers a range of monitoring controls over doctors, from job descriptions to mandatory physician peer review, to ensure that doctors provided
more cost-effective care (UK D epartment of Health 1989). The government
hoped that competition would not only yield more efficient health care
delivery but would also devolve responsibility for NHS performance failures
down to local purchasers and providers.
In practice, however, the central state exerted tight control over the
internal market. Thatcher's successor, John Major, streamlined the administrative tiers in the NHS, thereby increasing the capacity of ministers
and managers at the centre to intervene in the day-to-day administrative
10 A proposal for private health insurance that the Prime Minister's policy unit floated in
1982 met with fierce media criticism and public outcry, prompting Thatcher to disavow it
(see Timmins 1995). ·
Thatcher's health care reforms thus differed from her policy towards state earnings-related
pensions, which she gradually phased out (see Myles and Pierson, in this volume). But her
caution in health policy was not only because the NHS was less expensive than other alternatives. Rather, the political risks of switching to a new health care system were considerable.
The contrast with SERPS pensions is instructive. Unlike the NHS, which was more than
40 years old and upon which most Britons relied for health care, SERPS was an immature
programme with relatively few pensioners dependent on it. Thus, the political and financial
costs o f phasing out SERPS were smaller in comparison to the NHS.
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decisions of local units. And both he and Thatcher designed the market so
as to limit the scope of competition among providers in order to ensure that
they would not shy away from treating sicker, more expensive patients. 11
In some cases, this meant pre-empting market forces altogether, as with
Major's decision to pursue a centrally directed rationalization policy for
London hospitals rather than allow disruptive market forces to decide the
winners and losers (see James 1995). For their part, health service purchasers
and providers preferred co-operative, longer term contractual relationships
than the one-off encounters characteristic of a spot market that the Thatcher
Government had envisioned (Light 1997).
. How can one explain the continued presence of the state in the market,
and the very limited competition that was permitted? While the formidable
technical difficulties of creating a market from scratch required detailed
guidance and intervention from the NHS Executive, political considerations
proved a more powerful brake on the market. First, the universalism of the
NHS created a broad constituency with a stake in assuring access to quality
care. Any cost-cutting programme that threatened a steep and visible decline
in quality risked punishment at the polls from middle-class (and workingclass) voters. Second, the universal citizenship rights in the NHS created
a broad solidarity and commitment to equity that the pubHc expected the
government to guarantee. More than any other branch of the British welfare
state, the NHS has epitomized-or has at least aspired to-a comprehensive
notion of community based on Marshall's (1 963) idea of social citizenshi p,
and has expressed this soHdarity as the right of all to a comprehensive
level of care, (nearly) free of charge, on the basis of clinical need rather than
on ability to pay (Klein 1995: ch. l; Ministry of Health, no date; Speller 1948;
Titmuss 1974, 1987a, b)Y The deep attachment to the solidarity of the
NHS not only ran strong within the Labour Party (which, after all, had
created the health service), but also among the Tory wing of the Conservative Party that was sympathetic to state intervention in the economy and
in social welfare. All of these political considerations compelled the Conservatives to carefully craft and constrain the workings of the internal market
to avert the mos~ egregious inequities and chaos that unbrid led competition
would have unleashed.

Thus, the government limited GP fundholders' financial liability and the range of hospitaJ
services they could purchase, restricted the freedom of hospitals and fundholders to dispense
with their ' profits'. a nd mandated the development of a capitation system for purchasers that
wouJd adjust for inequities based on pa tients' health status (Maynard 1991; U K Department
of Health 1989).
12 Indeed, o pinion polls have consistently shown that the public remains strongly committed
to the principles of tax-financed. universalistic, and publicly provided health care a nd willing
to pay higher taxes for health care (Klein 1995: J 35- 6. 240; Taylor-Gooby 199 1: c h. 5).
11
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· Finally, the centralized structures of both the NHS and the political system made it hard for the government to 'let go' once the market was in place.
Because the central government provided health care and determined the
budget of the NHS, it had a direct stake in how that money was spent.
Government ministers had to deal with the Treasury's perennial concerns
over 'value for money', and Parliament's concern for the level of quality
of services. Ministers had to face the regular grilling of members of Parliament (MPs) during parbamentary question time, and were held accountable
for the performance failures even in the far-flung reaches of the NHS.
Government ministers deemed it intolerable to cede control to lower level
managers or to freewheeling market forces, while still being held responsible
by voters and MPs.
And even as the NHS placed a heavy obligation on politicians to safeguard the equity of health care provision as they pursued cost containment, it also granted them the means to do so. The statutory guarantee of
universal access gave government officials the authority to set rules on the
behaviour of purchasers and providers in the health care market to ensure
that their competitive behaviour did not come at the expense of the sickest
and most costly patients. At the same time, the hierarchical tiers of health
authorities served as the conduit through which the central government controlled the introduction and subsequent development of market forces in
the NHS.
How well, ·then, did Conservative governments uphold their role as
guarantor of equitable access for all while pursuing cost containment? On
the question of equity, the record is mixed. On the one hand, the internal
market reforms did not produce enough efficiency gains to make waiting
lists noticeably diminish, much less disappear. In and of themselves, waiting
lists do not offend equity, since one's place in the line is based on medical
need. But since the inception of the NHS, those with private insurance
have been able to jump ahead of the waiting lists for elective surgery. This
inequality of access between those with private and public coverage has long
been a point of contention in health politics, and only grudgingly tolerated
by Labour politicians. Still, the extent of this inequity is often exaggerated.
The segment of the population with private insurance has always been a small
minority; in 1990, only 11 per cent of the population had private coverage
(Klein 1995: 155; Timmins 1995: 507). Moreover, private coverage has
served more as a 'safety valve' for unmet need, rather than providing the
middle class a path of permanent exit from the public system. Those with
private insurance still receive most of their care from the NHS as public
patients, because private policies are restrictive in their scope of coverage,
and tend to be confined to profitable elective procedures and amenities like
private hospital room and choice of specialist (Klein 1995: 155- 7; Timmins
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1995: 507)Y This means that the bulk of the population accepts (even if
unenthusiastically) rationing of non-emergency hospital treatment th rough
waiting lists whose criterion is medical need . The question for British
policy makers is whether limiting access to non-emergency treatments still
imposes suffering a nd reduced quality of life for those on the lists.
A greater criticism is that the internal market's fundholding scheme
introduced a new kind of inequity of access among N HS patients themselves. N ow, the wait for elective surgery was no longer solely a question
of medical need but also of the ability of one's pu rchaser to pay. While the
evidence was by no means definitive, it suggested that larger fundholding
practices u sed their budgets and business savvy to achieve faster services
for their patients than di d non-fundholding practices. 14
On bala nce, however, the NHS has weathered the changes of the internal
market to retain much of its egalitarianism and universalism, and the Conservative reforms represented a quite limited challenge to solidarity. Universal
access to medically necessary care remains a statutorily gua ranteed, social
right of ci tizenshjp. And as noted above, policy makers have taken great care
to limit the play of ma rket forces in the NHS to avoid flagrant inequities.
Thus, fundholders and providers in the internal market operate under a number of constraints that discourage or prevent them from skimming the best
patients. M oreover, the Blair Government's intention to abolish fu ndholding
would presumably elimin ate the threat that the scheme posed to eq uity. 15
Private insurance covered 6.4% of the population in 1980, rising to 11.5% in 1989. T wentythree per cent of employers and managers had private insurance at the end of the 1980s, while
27% of professionals did (Klein 1995: 155). Private insurance was also a company fringe benefit
highly dependent on the health of the economy; in the recession of the early 1990s, private
insurance coverage stagnated. Among those with private insurance, more than half of their
in-patient stays and 80% of their out-patient stays were covered as N HS patients (Timmins
1995: 507). Finally, while the number of private hospitals and providers increased, and the
proportion of spending on institutional care rose from less than 10% in 1986 to 19% in 1993,
most of this growth was in the area of nursing home care, which the N HS did not cover anyway (K lein 1995: 158- 60; Timmins 1995: 507).
Waiting lists rose from 700,000 in 1992 to nearly 1.3 million by 1998 ('Bevan's Baby Hits
.
Middle Age', The Economist, 4 July 1998, 56).
14
Different contracts used by health authorities and fundholders accounted for some
of t he differences in access to hospital care (British M edical Journal, 12 Dec. 1992, 1451;
23 Jan . 1993, 227- 9; Whitehead 1993). But some observers countered that fundholding had
'spillover' effects that benefited all patients, and pointed to health authorities that consulted
non-fund holding G Ps in their purchasing decisions or that devolved purchasing decisions to
them (Klein 1995: 2~1 -2).
15 Fundholders will be replaced by larger primary care groups involving all G Ps, who will
purchase an array of services on behalf of DHAs for a population area of up to I00,000 patients.
The Blair Government's proposals also indicate that it will continue with the centralizing
tendencies of the Thatcher- Major reforms. The N HS Executive will have greater capacity
to monitor doctors' practice patterns and intervene in the local decisions of managers and
practitioners if deemed necessary (see Klein 1998; UK Department of Health 1997).
13

350

Susan Giaimo

But did the market deliver the hoped-for cost discipline? The NHS has
maintained its impressive record on containing costs relative to other OECD
countries, but this is less a result of market competition than the effectiveness of other policy instruments. In areas with multiple providers, the N H S
has become more responsive to patients or their fundholder agents. And
as a whole, more patients have been treated (Klein 1995). But the internal
market has been expensive to create and administer: it has generated substantial transaction costs in terms of administrative personnel, and required
generous financial inducements for GPs to take up fund holding. In any case,
such generosity proved fleeting, as the Major Government subsequently
resorted to a policy of austerity. 16 Thus, the remarkable cost discipline of the
NHS has been less an achievement of market efficiencies than of policy
makers' willingness to deploy the weapon of tight global budgets and the
public's tolerance of waiting lists in a government-created context of scarcity.
Germany: A 'Socially Bounded Market' within Corporatism 17

Germany's compulsory national insurance system covers 90 per cent of the
population through a network of approximately 500 quasi-public sickness
funds (Krankenkassen) organized on class, occupational, and regional lines
(Giamo and Monow 1999: 982). Despite their organizational differentiation,
the sickness funds provide similar benefits packages as mandated by law.
Employers and employees finance health insurance contributions in equal shares
and have a role in health care administration through parity representation
on the sickness funds' boards. 18 In granting employers and employees equal
roles in financing and administration, the German health insurance system
has institutionalized the idea of countervailing power in its very design.
Although the state does not finance health care, corporatist governance
accords it a critical role in regulating the behaviour of sectoral actors and
16

The number of managers soared from 700 in 1987 to over 13,000 in 199 1. Between 1991
and 1992, there was an a lmost 25% increase in managerial personnel while only a I'Yo rise in
hospital medical staff (Pike, 'NHS Managers' Wage Bill Soars', Financial Times, 5-6 Sept.
1992, 4; Pike, ' Rise of 25% in N HS M a nagers'. Financial Times, II Dec. 1993, 6). The Blair
Government calculated that managerial costs had risen from 9% to 12% (Klein 1998). G P
fund holders initially received financial sweeteners to encourage their take-up in the scheme,
though such payments were later discontinued (Sherman, ' 16,000 Pounds for BudgetHolding G Ps', The Times, 14 Dec. 1989, 22). Critics charged that the amounts devoted to
management merely siphoned ofT resources from direct patient care. Following its early generosity, the Major Government subsequently kept NHS spending increases well below the
rate of inflation. Thus, NHS spending was projected to rise a mere 0.3% from 1996 to 1999
('An Unhealthy Silence', The Economist, IS Mar. 1997, 57).
17
T he title is borrowed from Henke ( 1997).
18 T he boards of the sickness funds set the level of contribution rates, though in practice
that power is circumscribed by law: the sickness funds cannot run long-term defici ts, so their
cont ribution rates must cover their health care expenditures.
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setting out the overall objectives for the·system. Through the instrument of
framework legislation, the government sets out broad policy goals and rules
for the health care system but then delegates the job of implementation to
quasi-public associations. of sickness funds and physicians (Kasseniirztliche
Vereinigungen, or KVs) at the provincial level. Guided by the principles of ·
subsidiarity and self-governance by sectoral actors, the state does not usually intervene directly in health care administration. But if sectoral actors
refuse to implement the terms of the law, then the s~te may exercise its reserve
powers of intervention until doctors and insurers prove able and willing to
fulfil their public obligations. Once they do, the state pulls back and allows
them to reclaim their collective rights of self-governance (Giaimo 1994, 1995;
Gjaimo and Manow 1999; Streeck and Schmitter 1985).
As part of its authority to set the parameters of the health care system,
the state mandates that all employers offer insurance to their workers with
incomes below a certain ceiling, finance contributions in equal shares with
employees, and share with them in the administration of the sickness funds.
In addition, the state also devises cost-containment policies that health care
system actors are required to follow. For example, hospital doctors are salaried,
while office-based practitioners must live within the confines of a regional
or state-level budget cap for their services as negotiated by provincial-level
associations of physicians and insurers. 19 In addition, providers and insurers
are legaJly required to align their collective bargaining agreements with the
principle of stable contri buti on rates (Beitragssatzstabilitiit). However, as we
shall see, the state sometimes has difficulty getting doctors and payers to
follow these provisions in their collective agreements.
Because health insurance is employment-based, rising health care costs have
always had a direct effect on labour costs. But Germany's bleaker economic
conditions in the past decade have placed serious strain on a welfare state
financed from payroll contributions. The worldwide recession of the early
1990s, along with the costs of German unification, drove up the demand for
unemployment insurance, while firms increased their use of early retirement
and disability pensions to shed older and less productive workers (Manow
1997a). 20 Unemployment and labour force exit meant a smaller .base of wages
and salaries from which to finance growing demands for social insurance,
so that by 1996, social insurance contributions had risen to nearly 41 per
cent of wages (OECO 1996d: 76, and see Table 11.3). At the same time,
German firms were coming under considerable competitive pressures from
19

Ambulatory physicians receive fee-for-service reimbursement, but their level of payments
may be adjusted downward over the course of the year in order to remain within the cap.
20 The welfare state accoun ted for approximately 18% of the transfers to eastern Germany
up through 1995, largely for unemployment benefits and early retirement pensions. Not
surprisingly, these fu nds incurred enormous deficits as a result (see Heilemann and R appen
1997: 13, J5).
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TABLE

11.3. Social insurance and health care contribution rates in Germany, .1960- 96
( as % of gross wages)

Year

Employer- employee
joint contribution rate
to social insurance

1960a
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
J993b
1995
1996

24.4

26.5
30.5
32.4

Average contribution
ra te to sickness funds

8.4
8.2

10.5
11.4
11.8

35.1
35.6

12.6

37.4
39.3
41.0

13.4
13.2
13.6

" 1960: blue-collar workers' funds only; after 1960, all funds.
b Since 1991, western German states only.
Source: Manow 1997a: Federal Ministry of Labor.

globalization and the completion of Europe's single market. As a result,
employers began to call upon government to stabilize social insurance outlays in order to help them bring their labour costs under control. In this
they found support from scholars and policy makers who argued that high
social insurance contributions were partly responsible for pricing labour out
of the market, especially in lower productivity services (Esping-Andersen
1996c; OECD 1996d: ch. 3; Scharpf 1997b).
Even though pensions comprised the largest share of the social insurance bill and policy makers had reined in the medical inflation of the 1970s,
health care costs remained a concern. Indeed, health care costs began to
accelerate again from the late 1980s, and Germany had the dubious honour
of ranking second in the OECD in health spending (OECD 1997b: 68- 71 ;
OECD 1998e). While some of the rise in expenditures lay in demographic
developments and the costs of unification, inefficiencies within the health
sector itself were also responsible. Chief among these was the per-diem reimbursement of hospitals, which encouraged unusually long in-patient stays.
Another was the imbalance in the relationship between doctors and insurers. Corporatist self-governance was premissed on the KVs and sickness
funds being in rough balance so that each could act as a counterweight to
the other. But the reality was different. The KVs exploited their monopoly
position in the face of a fragmented insurers side to negotiate generous
fee settlements (Stone 1980). Thus, if record joblessness made it difficult
to justify slashing unemployment insurance or early retirement pensions,
the health sector seemed long overdue for efforts to seek out economies
(Hinrichs 1995).
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The Kohl Government's health care cost-containment strategy involved
a mixed menu of delegating new policy tasks to corporatist actors, a careful
experiment with market competition, and limited cost-sharing by patie~ts.
The 1988 Health Care Reform Law (GRG) relied on the usual method of
corporatist delegation of policy tasks to doctors and insurers. Thus, the law
required payers and providers to follow the goal of stable contribution rates
in their collective agreements on remuneration, and mandated doctors' and
insurers' associations to negotiate maximum prices for pharmaceuticals as
well as practice guidelines with which to monitor physician prescribing and
ensure that doctors practised cost-effective and .clinically consistent medicine.
The GRG also introduced minor co-payments on prescription drugs and
hospital stays. But insurance contributions continued to rise, and the Kohl
Government blamed the doctors for refusing to implement many aspects of
the law.
Frustrated with the apparent failures of corporatist self-governance, the
government passed the Health Care Structural Reform Law (GSG) in 1992.
With this law, policy makers invoked their reserve powers to suspend doctors'
and insurers' self-governance rights. Thus, the health ministry set budgets
by decree for all areas of the health care system for three years, mandated
a two-year price freeze for prescription drugs, and forced the medical associations to assume financial liability for cost overruns in physician prescribing. The law also promulgated slight increases in patient co-payments. Most
important, the law introduced market competition among payers. Beginning
in 1997, all patients were granted free choice of insurer. But a financial riskadjustment scheme among sickness funds preceded choice of insurer in order
to level the playing field among funds with very different health risks.
However, Kohl was not eager to have the state permanently enmeshed
in the administrative domain of doctors and insurers. But neither could be
afford a cost surge in the health sector once the budgets were lifted. 21 Kohl's
answer to this dilemma was the two Health Care Restructuring Laws of 1997
(NOG 1 and 2). Under the· NOGs, the state retreated from setting budgets
for most subsectors of the health care system, returned to free collective
bargaining between the KVs and insurers, and even extended the scope of
their negotiations to the setting of practice guidelines for other subsectors
of the health care system. But even as the government reiterated its commitment to corporatist self-governance, it compensated for the lifting of budgets
on providers wi~h a greater reliance on market competition among insurers
and cost-sharing by patients. Hence, the NOG required that if a fund raised
its contribu tion rate, it would have to increase its co-payments by the same
As a short-term response to employers, the government enacted the Contribution Relief
Act (Beitragsenrlastungsgesetz) in 1996. That law required all funds to cut their contribution
rates by 0.7% for 1997 (OECD 1997b: 85).
21
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percentage. But patients facing a hike in contributions and co-payments would
be free to switch insurers without the usual waiting period. In effect, the
government's budgeting policy shifted from the sectoral level to that of the
individual sickness fund. 22 The government reasoned that this would put ~ick
ness funds under severe pressure to not raise their rates and to instead take
a tougher line in their negotiations with providers. Finally, the government
also introduced provisions that required greater cost-sharing from patients:
co-payments were now to be Linked to the development of wages and salaries,
while marginal benefits were struck from the statutory insurance catalogue
and offered as 'extras' for patients to purchase from insurers.23
The NOGs signalled a shifting of the burden of cost containment onto
patients and insurers. But they were far less drastic than some of the proposals considered during the reform debates between 1995 and 1997. The key
goal was to relieve employers' of their share of non-wage labour costs. The
most radical proposal would have called for employers' exit from financing
health insurance altogether and substituting parity financing with compulsory, individual insurance borne solely by workers. However, a 'wage
subsidy' would have compensated employees for this new expense.24
This proposal failed, however, not only because unions and the Social
Democratic Party (SOP) predictably opposed it, but also because employers
themselves had little interest in it. Employers argued that the Free
Democratic Party (FDP) proposal would not have solved the problem of
labour costs, but would have merely shifted the battle to the collective bargaining arena, where unions would have certainly demanded higher wages
as compensation for the substantial new health insurance costs borne by
their members ('Haarscharf' 1995). Furthermore, employers reasoned that
relief from the responsibility of financing health care would also mean
losing their representation on sickness funds' boards and their ability to influence health policy more generally ('Haarscharf ' 1995). Finally, the coalition
government itself was by no means of a common mind on the proposal. The
CDU's trade union wing was adamantly opposed to it on the grounds that
it violated the principles of parity financing and administration of health
22

Manow has made this point in G iaimo and Manow (1999).
The 1996 Contribution Relief Act removed the marginal benefits from the statutory
catalogue. For details on the 1997 laws, see Dienst fiir Gesellschaftspo/itik (20 Feb. 1997 and
27 Mar. 1997); Giaimo 1998; Giaimo and Manow 1999; and Manow 1997b.
24
The strongest backer of this proposal was the F ree Democratic Party in Kohl 's coalition
government. 'Union und FOP geben einander die Schuld am Abbruch der Gesprache tiber die
G esundbeitsreform ', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 9 Oct. 1995, 1- 2; ' Wettbewerb
zwischen Krankenkassen soli verstiirkt werden', FAZ, 15 Dec. 1995, I; ' Haarscharf wieder so',
Der Spiegel, 23 Oct. 1995, 30- 1. The reform debate also considered more solidaristic proposals (such as taxing sources of income beyond wages and salaries, or bringing io segments
of the population exempt from statutory insurance). For a discussion of the range of proposals considered between 1995 and 1997, see Giaimo 1998; Hinrichs 1995: 637- 79; Advisory
Council for t he Concerted Action in H ealth Care 1995:44- 7, and 1997: 32- 46). For a recent
d iscussion of reform alternatives, see OECD 1997b.
23
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care, while the health minister was fundamentally at odds with t he FOP's
neoliberal vision of individual responsibility and market provision for health
care ('Die FDP unter Druck', FAZ , 9 Oct. 1995, I; ' Haarscharf ' 1995) ..
The interactions amo ng actors in the German health care system, the
broader political econom y, and the political arena thus produced an overall reform pattern during the Kohl era that required a balancing of the goals
of cost control with equity. All three arenas affected the strategic calculations of payers and policy makers and made it difficult for any one actor
to pursue cost containmen t at the expense of other players. The health care
system itself has lirruted the room for manoeuvre of employers, but so has
its relationship to the larger political economy. Thus, the statutory .nature
of heal th insurance did not allow employers lo reduce their labour costs
by refusing to provide health insurance or by unilaterally curbing benefits.
Moreover, even when given the option of exit, employers refused to take
it because they recognized that they face a formidable counterweight in
employees' presence in health insurance financing and administration, as well
as in union strength in collective bargaining.25 Business leaders knew that
victory in one arena could just as easily translate into setbacks in ano ther,
and they saw their role in statutory social insurance as a va luable lever to
control non-wage labour costs.
The G erman po litical system also granted key health care stakeholders a
number of avenues to shape the content of reform legislation. The political
parties and federalism were the chief avenues of influence fo r employees
as well as employers. Both of the two main politicaJ parties- the Christian
Democratic Union (CD U) and the SPD are heterogeneous Volk sparteien or
'catch-all parties' (Kirchheimer 1966) representing the interests of employees and vulnerable gro ups in the population. The CD U institutiona lizes
both a business and Catholic trade union wing in separate intern al party
committees. The trade union wing of the C DU, with jurisdiction over the
party's social policy matters, was the driving force behind the hardship
exemptions on co-payments that featured in all of the health care reform
laws. The GSG's measures reducing the disparities in choice of insurer and
in contribution rates between blue- and white-collar workers were the product of a cross-patty deal between the CDU's trade union wing and the opposition SPD in 1992. This 'de facto grand coalition' between the CDU an d SPD
was an expression of federalism and the Social Democrats' maj ority in the
legislative upper house (Bundesrat), as well as of the ideological a ffinity
between the C DU 's labo ur wing and the SPD's moderate wing on the social
market economy (sozia/e Marktwirtschaft) and a comprehensive welfare state.
25

German unions only organize 35% of the labo ur force, but state extension of collective agreements grants them fa r more influence than membership num bers would suggest.
Unions and employees are a lso firm ly entrenched in the governance of the firm thiough
co-determination arra ngements.
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But health politics and policies also were shaped by electoral outcomes and
coalition politics. Encouraged by its improved showing.in state elections in
1996, the FDP became a more pugnacious coalition partner eager to dis. tinguish itself from the CDU and refusing to countenance further deals
with the SPD. On top of this, Kohl's Government had only a razor-thin
majority in the lower house (Bundestag) after 1994. To keep his fractious
coalition together, Kohl had to yield to the FDP more than he had in the
past. With the NOGs, then, the FDP played its familiar role as the patron of
physicians and small business. Along with pressure from the CDU's business
wing, whose influence had increased as the economic climate had deteriorated,
Kohl chose the NOGs' provisions to stabilize employers' labour costs at the
expense of patients and sickness funds.
Finally, the national insurance system both constrained and empowered
state actors in the task of health care reform. Because national insurance
guarantees all persons the same access to services based on medical need,
and is modelled on contributory social insurance, it is very difficult for the
state to pursue austerity at the expense of any one class or subgroup of
the population. At the same time, however, the corporatist arrangements in
the national insurance system provide the state with the legal authority
and the institutional means-through its leverage over public-law bodies-to
mandate cost-containment tasks on health care actors and to set the terms
of market competition in ways that do not compromise the equity and
solidarity of the system.
How, then, should we judge the Kohl Government's record on balancing
costs and equity? Had they been fully implemented, it is clear that the NOGs
would have shifted the burden of welfare state and economic adjustment
from employers to patients. Dynamized co-payments and the linking of contribution to co-payment increases implied a gradual movement away from
the principle of parity financing, since employees already paid half of the
insurance contribution and patients would have also had to assume a growing portion of health care costs out of their own pocket (Manow l997b).
But in important respects, the Kohl Government's policies largely preserved
the equity of the health care system, and in some cases, even extended it.
Health insurance has remained universal and the statutory catalogue of benefits generous; the services struck from the catalogue in 1996 were quite
marginal. Hardship clauses have exempted low-income persons from the
co-payment requirement or otherwise set a ceiling on the amount that those
with chronic conditions would have to pay. And the government designed
market forces in such a way as to advance both efficiency and equity concerns. Thus, insurers cannot compete on the basis of fewer benefits to woo
healthier members but instead must ·accept all applicants and must offer,
at a minimum, the same health services to all members contained in the
catalogue of statutory benefits. Significantly, competition has granted wage

Who Pays for Health Care Reform?

357

earners·nearly identical rights of choice of insurer as those long enjoyed by
salaried employees. Likewise, the risk adjustment scheme has required substantial financial transfers from the company and white-collar funds, which
had a history of healthier and wealthier members, to the local funds, which
had had to levy higher contributions to cover the health care costs of their
poorer and sicker blue-collar members. The risk-adjustment scheme has also
narrowed contribution rates considerably among funds, to the benefit of bluecollar workers. 26 The risk-adjustment programme also reduces the temptation
· of sickness funds to compete by cream-skimming the healthier c;tnd wealthier
persons, since they know they will have to make payments to funds with poorer
health risk profiles. Finally, the most controversial provisions of the 1997 laws
did not get very far in practice. Fearing punishment from voters in the 1998
elections, the Kohl Government refrained from implementing the provisions
linking co-payments and contributions, while Kohl's Social Democratic
successor, Gerhard Schroder, suspended the dynamization of co-payments
and other market-like measures (Manow 1997b; Schneider 1998). 27
Under Kohl's watch, the cost performance of the German health care
system has also been respectable. To be sure, health insurance contribution
rates have risen nearly every year, but the pace has been moderate: the
average contribution rate, which stood at 12.6 per cent in 1990, was only
13.6 per cent in 1996 (Manow 1997a: table 3), despite the burdens of an
ageing population, recession, and unification. This is not to say that Germany
has found a way to permanently halt the upward trajectory of health
care spending. But it has so far held the line and should be seen as an intermediate case between the tight-fistedness and unmet demand of Britain and
the profligacy and cost-shifting of the United States.
The United States: The Triumph of 'Unmanaged
Competition' and the Defeat of Equity
The most striking feature of the American health care system is the
absence of a statutory universal health care programme and an employmentbased fringe benefits system in its stead. Most Americans look to their
employers to prov.ide health insurance, while public programmes are confined
26
One fund , for example, ·had to pay approximately half of its revenues to the risk adjustment fund (OECD 1997: 107). In 1993, approximately 32% of funds levied contribution rates
I% above or below the average. In 1996, less than 100/r, of the funds did so (Ministry of Health,
cited in Giaimo and Manow 1999: 982).
27
Kohl's successor, Gerhard Schroder, announced upon taking office that his SPD-Green
government would not introduce the linkage provisions, and abolished the provision for dynamizing co-payments and some of the other market-like mechanisms, such as premium rebates for
healthy patients, that the 1997 laws had introduced. The Schroder Government also reimposed
legal budgets on all subsectors o f the health care system as an interim cost control measure
until it devised a comprehensive reform scheduled for the year 2000 (Schneider 1998).
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to designated categories of the population, such as the elderly, disabled, the
military, and the very poorest in society. Such arrangements make employers
the pivotal players in the health care system and health care politics. They
are free to decide whether or not to provide insurance as a fringe benefit,
and when they do, most companies pay the bulk of the insurance premium
(at least of the cheapest health plan). Unions offer little in the way of countervailing power because they have little or no presence in the workplace and
no role in welfare state administration. 28 Likewise, gove-r nment actors have
few mechanisms to control the beh aviour of employers and insurers in a
voluntary, private fringe benefits system. State governments have limited
regulatory authority over the employment-based insurance sector, while the
federal government's reach is even more at arm's length.
Because of this patchwork system, the US health care system has
always been plagued by costly gaps in access. The uninsured had access
to emergency hospital care, and the safety-net providers who treated them
recouped their losses by charging patients with private insurance higher fees.
Insurers, in turn, passed on their cost increases to employers by charging
them higher premiums (Reinhardt 1992). Thus, an elaborate but largely
hidden cost-shifting game was being played, but with only some employers
footing the bill. Rationing access by ability to pay was both inequitable and
inefficient: it burdened vulnerable groups in society, encouraged free-riding
by Jess efficient firms, and discouraged the uninsured from seeking out less
expensive preventive care instead of costly hospital care.
But other reasons besides gaps in access and resultant cost-shifting were
behind the high costs of the US health care system. Most physicians received
fee-for-service payments for their services while hospitals were reimbursed for
their costs, which gave them little incentive to seek out less expensive alternatives. Insurers largely paid what doctors billed without questioning treatme.nt
decisions, thereby deferring to physicians' economic and clinical freedom. The
USA never had a mechanism like global budgeting to limit overall health care
expenditures. Nor was there an effective system for controlling the diffusion
of medical technology. 29 And until the adven t of managed care, the USA
had n o gatekeeper system to limit access to specialists or to hospitals.
The cost-shifting game did not arouse too much complaint from employers as long as the economy kept growing and American businesses were
shielded from the effects of competition. But a number of factors converged
to undermine firms' willingness to underwrite the care of the uninsured.
F irst, medical inflation began to rise steeply in the 1980s (see Table 11.4).
211

There are some exceptions, however. Some unions finance and administer insurance funds
for their members. And employers who choose to self-finance their own health plans may
directly administer these plans. But in many cases, employers contract with an insurance company for administration .
29
On state efforts to control high technology in hospitals, see Russell 1979.
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TABLE 11.4. Changes in medical care costs compared to Consumer
Price Index, US ( 1967 =100)
Year

CPI

Total Medicine

H ospital

Physicians ·

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1996

88.7
94.5
116.3
J61.2
246.8
326.6
421.8
49l.4
512.5

79.1
89.5
120.6
168.6
265.9
413.0
592.9
817.6
847.8

57.3
75.9
145.4
236.1
418.9
722.5
1096.1
1577.1
1638.6

77.0
88.3
121.4
169.4
269.3
407.9
533. 1
692.5
7 17.0

Source: Peters 1999: 251: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States.

Employers' health insurance premiums escalated at double-digit annual
rates in the 1980s; between 1987 and 1993, employers' insurance premiums
rose 90 per cent (Cooper and Schone 1997: 142).
More tellingly, the spike in health care inflation coincided with broader
changes in the American economy since the 1970s. The shift to a postindustrial economy brought with it the disappearance of unionized jobs in
manufacturing that had come with generous fringe benefits. In their place
arose service sector jobs, temporary positions, and subcontracted labour
in both manufacturing and services. Such contingent labour was one of the
chief means for employers to hold down their labour costs, since these jobs
often paid much lower wages than unionized jobs in manufacturing and did
not come with health insurance and other fringe benefits (R. Freeman 1994). 30
Thus, the shifts in the American economy swelled the ranks of the uninsured,
adding to the cross-subsidy burden of employers who did provide insurance.
As their health insurance bills rose, these firms complained that they were at
a competitive disadvantage relative to their domestic rivals who did not provide insurance, or to those foreign competitors with lower labour costs.
As the 1980s wore on, employers who provided insurance becrune less willing to shoulder the access and cost deficiencies in the health care system.
Many of them began to look to government to relieve them of their crosssubsidy burden through a national health insurance solution (C. J. Martin
I995a). Those advocating national insurance found a sympathetic ally in
Presiden t Bill Clinton, who wanted to control the costs of public insurance
30

The proportion of uninsured Americans had declined throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and
the 1980s as a result of the expansion of Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-based insurance.
However, the downward trend began to reverse itself in the late 1980s. Most of the uninsured
were those in the labour market (Banks, Kunz, and Macdonald 1994: 19). In 1987, 14.8%, or
31.8 miJlion non-elderly Americans had no insurance. By 1995, that figure bad risen to 17.4%
of the non-elderly population, or 40.3 million persons (EBRI 1997).
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p'rogramrnes, address employers' competitiveness concerns, and stem the
rising tide of the uninsured.
With his plan for national health insurance and government-structured
market competition, Clinton sought to solve both the cost and access
problems simultaneously. 31 First, Clinton's Health Security plan would have
required all firms to provide insurance, with the government subsidizing the
costs to small firms or those individuals unable to obtain insurance through
the workplace. Pooling all risks within a national insurance system would
have achieved universal access and ended the cost-shifting and free-riding
by firms that did not provide insurance. Second, Health Security mandated
market competition among both providers and insurers to control health
care costs, while largely pinning its hopes on health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to bring cost discipline to the market. By restricting patients'
access to hospitals and specialists, HMOs tended to be much cheaper than
other types of health plans. More expensive insurers would either have to
reduce their costs to retain patients or else charge higher premiums and impose
cost-sharing for additional benefits or greater choice of provider. 32
Third, government actors would have played a leading role in structuring
the market to ensure universal access and to prevent insurers and providers
from engaging in competitive practices that harmed the sicker and poorer.
States would have been key actors in this regard by establishing quasi-public
'health alliances' on a regional basis to ensure that small businesses and
individuals had access to affordable coverage. In short, alliances would have
organized the market and 'managed' the competition through extensive monitoring of insurers to prevent them from cream-skimming (Starr 1994: 53,
102). Large companies that self-insured could have chosen to opt out of the
state alliances and instead constitute their own alliances (C. J. Martin 1995b).
Finally, the Clinton plan would have expanded the federal government's
reach over employment-based insurance. The Health Security Act would have
legislated a minimum but comprehensive benefits package that all plans had
to offer. In addition, a National Health Board, with members appointed
by the President, would have possessed wide-ranging powers to regulate alliances and health plans. And because the Clinton administration doubted
that competition alone could control costs, the National Health Board would
have had the authority to enforce a global budget cap over the entire health
care system by limiting insurers' premium increases to the rate of inflation
(Starr 1994).
31

Unless otherwise noted, the description of the Clinton plan is drawn from the Wltite House
Domestic Policy Council (WHDPC 1993). Clinton's plan drew heavily on Stanford health
economist Alain Enthoven 's theory of managed competition (see Enthoven 1988, 1993).
32 Employers would have shouldered 80% of the premium of the cheapest plan. with
employees paying the 20o/o balance plus any addjtio nal premium costs if they chose more
expensive plans.
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Clinton's effort to introduce national health insurance came to an inglorious end, but this did not mean that health care reform was dead. Rather,
transformation of the health care system continued apace at breathtaking
scope and speed, with employers leading the charge in an uncoordinated,
every firm-for-itself strategy. The centrepiece of this strategy was the deployment of competition against insurers and providers. Under pressure from
employers to hold the line on premiums, managed care plans negotiated steep
price discounts or capitation arrangements with doctors and hospitals.33 Many
employers also sought to control their health care costs by offering workers
only one health plan, often an inexpensive HMO. ·Others rushed to self-insure
in .order to escape state risk-pools for the unin~ured and other consumer
regulations. In addition, employers engaged in a number of strategies that
shifted their costs onto weaker market actors. For instance, companies required their workers to shoulder a greater share of insurance premiums or
co-payments or curtailed the range of benefits that health insurance plans
offered. Finally, some companies exercised their ultimate exit option by refusing to provide coverage at all (Giaimo 1996; Giaimo and Manow 1999).
Employers' strategies to contain their labour costs are best characterized as
'unmanaged competition' (Giaimo 1996), in which the application of market
forces in health care has proceeded in the absence of an effective regulatory
framework that would prohibit or compensate for market failures. Federal
and state government controls over employers' and insurers' cost-cutting practices have been piecemeal, weak, or non-existent. Where government action
bas occurred, it has largely taken the form of incremental regulation of the
insurance market to foster competition, as with federal and state oversight
of mergers (Given 1997), or to make it conform to the dictates of the larger
economy (Giaimo and Manow 1999). 34 The absence of a framework of rules
over the market has permitted insurers to continue to segment the market
and shun the worst health risks. And the absence of effective consumer protections in the world of managed care has also provoked a public backlash
against the rationing decisions of HMOs (Blendon et al. 1998).
33 By 1997, 85% of employees were in some type of managed care plan, up from slightly more
than 28% in 1988 (Milt Freudenheim , To Economists, Managed Care is No Cure-All', N e w
York Times, 6 Sept. 1994, A I, A I0; Freudenheim, ' Health Insurers Seek Big Increases in their
Premiums' , New York Times, 24 Apr. J998, A I, C4). For an excellent survey of recent managed
care developments, see.Wilkerson, Devers, and Given 1997: esp. ch. I and conclusion chapter.
The editors point out that while managed care plans have a long history, the phenomenon
of intensified price cumpetition among these health plans is a recent development.
34
The 1996 Kassebaum- Kennedy Act was an attempt to respond to employers' concerns
with 'job-lock' by barring insurers from denying coverage to new employees with pre-existing
medjcal conditions. But because the law made no provision that premiums would be affordable and allowed insurers to impose a waiting period before coverage began, it fell far short
of its goal (Fuchs et a!. 1997; GAO 1998; Robert Pear, 'Clinton to Punish Insurers Who Deny
Health Coverage', New York Times, 7 July 1998, AI, Al3).

362

Susan Giaimo

How can we understand a reform path that started out as a solidaristic
. attempt at national insurance but ended up as atomistic cost-shifting at the
·expense of broader solidarity? The explanation lies in the critical role played
by employers, their inability to forge a common line around a solidaristic
solution to their labour costs problem, and the voluntarism of the fringe
benefits system that instead encouraged their go-it-alone strategies of cost
containment. Employers were critical to the fate of the Clinton plan because
they financed health insurance and would have continued to do so under
Health Security. As a result, the Clinton plan was held hostage to the veto
of business. Firms' disarray in the political arena mirrored their actions
in the health care system itself, with employers organizationally incapable
of delivering support to the President. Moreover, the voluntarism of the
American health insurance system encouraged employers to pursue multiple go-it-alone cost-containment strategies and blocked effective government
action to limit their behaviour in ways that would protect solidarity. Let us
consider each of these points in turn.
First, a firm's particular position in the health care system shaped its
approach to controlling labour costs and the attitudes of its managers
towards reform. For some employers, the voluntarism of the fringe benefits
system aided them in their quest for low labour costs, but for others, it was
a big part of the problem. As we have seen, many employers who already
provided insurance blamed their high labour costs on the free-riding of their
colleagues who did not offer coverage, and supported national insurance to
level the competitive playing field among them. Most small businesses, by
contrast, saw the voluntarism of employment-based insurance as vital to their
economic survival; the freedom to not provide insurance was what allowed
them to keep their labour costs at competitive levels. Not surprisingly, they
vehemently opposed the Clinton plan on the grounds that it would saddle
them with ruinously high labour costs. But even among firms that provided
insurance, there were those who rejected the Clinton plan because they
feared that it would have meant higher costs. Either they would have been
forced into regional alliances and would have paid higher premiums in order
to subsidize insurance for small businesses. Or, if they were large enough to
constitute their own alliances, they ran the risk that the even larger regional
alliances would have negotiated better rates from insurers and left them
with higher premiums (Judis 1995; C. J. Martin 1995a, l995b). For different
reasons, then, these employers believed they could better control their own
costs by 'going-it-alone'.
Second, the business community proved incapable of forging a common
line on health care reform, in large part because the health care system granted
its member firms mu ltiple ways to control their labour costs, including not
providing insurance at all. The freedom of action in the health care system,
in turn, aggravated employers' collective action problems in the political arena.
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_Employers' peak associations- perenni.ally weak, fragmented, and lacking
sanctions over recalcitrant members- proved ·unable to overcome the centrifugal tendencies within their ranks to rally their members to support the
Clinton plan at the criticar legislative stage. Associations representing large
and medium-sized firms remained on the sidelines and left the field open
to small business, whose association waged a highly effective ~ampaign of
opposition.35 Third, many businesses deemed Clinton's attempt to claim a
greater government role in employment-based insurance as an illegitimate
intrusion into their domain of corporate governance. Some employers- and
not just small businesses-opposed Clinton's national insurance proposal
because the employer mandate and statutory benefits package would. have
encroached upon their freedom to decide on insurance coverage for their
employees. Others were even more alarmist, arguing that national insurance
was an entering wedge for government intrusion into other areas of corporate governance (Judis 1995).
Subsequent government attempts to regulate the health care market
after the Clinton plan's defeat have met with similar failure. Employers and
insurers continue to regard government efforts to regulate employer-based
health plans as iJJegitimate and as saddling them with unwanted costs. Moreover, the perversities of federalism have meant that state and federal officials
work at cross-purposes, blocking one another's efforts to expand access or enact
adequate consumer protections on employment-based insurance. The biggest

obstacle is the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), which
permits states to regulate private insurance but not employers' self-insured
health plans. Not surprisingly, employers have seized upon self-insurance
to avoid cooptation into state risk-pools for the uninsured and to evade state
consumer protection regulations for private insurers. At the same time,
however, federal regulation of self-insured plans and employer-based health
insurance more generally is notoriously weak. The result is a dual system
of government regulation that.shields self-insured plans- whose numbers are
increasing- from regulations that apply to other types of private insurers. 36
35

For accounts of business o rganizations' disarray towards the Cbnton plan, see Adam
Clymer, Robert Pear, ·and Robin Toner, ' For Health Care, Time Was a Killer', New York
Times, 29 Aug. 1994, AI , A8- 9; Judis 1995; Jurek Martin, ' Business Snubs Clinton Health
Bill', Financial Times, 4 Feb: 1994, 5; Skocpol 1996; and Robin Toner, 'Autopsy on Health
Care', N ew York Times, 27 Sept. 1994, AI ff.
36
For a discussion of ERISA, see Acs et al. 1996; Chirba-Martin and Brennan 1994; GAO
1995; Grogan 1995; O'Keefe 1995; and Polzer and Butler 1997. Seventy-eight per cent of companies with I,000 or more employees and 89% with 20,000 or more employees were self-insured
in 1993. Self-insurance has beeri growing: among firms with at least 100 employees, 46% of
employees were enrolled in self-insured plans in 1993, compared to only 28% in 1986 (GAO
1995: 12- 13). The Clinton administration bad pushed for comprehensive consumer protection
legislation at the federal level to regulate the rationing decisions by HMOs. But its efforts
became bogged down in the impeachment scandal (see Giaimo and Man ow J999; R. Pear,
'Senators Reject Bill to Regulate Care by HMOs', New York Times, 10 Oct. 1998, AI , A8).
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· Health care reform through the market, led by private actors in the
absence of public rules, has worrying implications for the achievement of both
cost control and equitable access and financing. On the positive side, the
USA experienced a noticeable slowing in health care outlays between 1993
and 1996. The spread of managed care plans in the private sector, with their
restricted access to hospitals and specialists and their reliance on capitation
or discounts to pay providers, has wrung out much of the excess capacity in
the health care system and is responsible for much of the slowdown in health
care outlays (Levit et al. 1998; S. Smith et al. 1998). However, it may be that
the days of easy savings have come to an end, as mergers and acquisitions
among plans and providers reach a saturation point (S. Smith et al. 1998).
Indeed, after slowing considerably in the last few years, employers' health
insurance premiums are set to rise substantially, as insurers seek to recover
lost profits after years of belt-tightening.37
Moreover, cost savings for some have been realized at the expense of equity.
While insurers have recently hiked their premiums, the biggest increases have
fallen on small firms and individuals, not large companies.38 In addition, firms'
and insurers' cost-cutting strategies have segmented the market further and
threaten what little solidarity there is in the health care system. The current
trend shows the number of uninsured growing as employers-willingly or
otherwise- exercise their exit option and refuse to offer coverage or as
low-wage workers find insurance premiums beyond their reach (Cooper and
Schone 1997). Those individuals with insurance coverage are also bearing
a greater share of their health care costs. Finally, continued cost-shifting
to weaker market players only aggravates the problem of the uninsured, as
small firms and individuals find themselves priced out of the market by
exorbitant premiums. The 'worst case' scenario predicts the disintegration
of public hospital 'providers of last resort' and more restricted access for
the most vulnerable members of society as employers' and insurers' costcutting actions, along with cuts in government programmes, destroy the
cross-subsidy for the uninsured. 39 Thus, absent effective public intervention,
37

Real per capita health spending averaged just below 5% per year between 1970 and 1993.
Between 1993 and I 996. it averaged o nly 1.5% per year. But it is set to grow at 3.4% per year
from 1997 to 2007, with the percentage ofGDP predicted to rise to 16.6% in 2007 (S. Smith
et al. I 998: 128- 9).
Js Milt Freudenheim, ' Health Care Costs Edging Up and a Bigger Surge is Feared', New
York Times, 2 1 Jan. 1997, A I, D 20; Freudenheim, ' H ealth [nsurers Seek Big Increases in
their Premiums', New York Times, 24 Apr. 1998, AI , C4. Ln addition to cost-shifting from
stronger to weaker market players, the higher costs may be due to patients demanding greater
choice of physician, and doctors orgaruzing to counteract the growth of HMOs.
39 For evidence of the 'worst case' scenario and the threat to the public hospital system.
see the Los Angeles Times series in October 1995. Reinhardt (1995) paints a somewhat less
pessimistic portrait, but one that still envisions safety-net providers bearing the brunt of the
burden.
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the ultimate logic of employer-led, go-it-alone strategies threatens both the
cost-containment goals of many individual firms as well as the survival of
the health care system itself.

4. CONCLUSION
The health care reform experiences suggest broader lessons for the politics
of welfare state adjustment in the twenty-first century. The first lesson is that
payers have become the driving force behind reform and they are likely to
remain importan t actors in the poli tics of welfare state adjustment as long
as economic difficulties associated with globalization or the post-industrial
economy continue. But this should not lead to the conclusion that their views
will always prevail. The terms of welfare state adjustment will depend on
the presence of countervailing forces in the particular welfare state and political arena·in each country.
Second, employers (and governments) are undeniably worried about the
welfare state's effects on competitiveness. But their concerns need not translate into a policy stance that is anti-welfare state or anti-solidaristic. As the
accounts of health care reform in the USA and Germany illustrate, many
companies may favour a statutory, solidaristic solution because it pools risks
and levels the competitive playing field among them. This suggests that
employers' views towards the welfare state will depend on whether they see it
as compatible with their competitiveness strategies. The strategies employers
choose to contain their labour costs, in turn, will in part depend on the type
of welfare state in which they find themselves and the freedom of action it
grants or denies them to do so.
Thus, there is no one welfare state that best serves the cause of competitiveness, or even one particular welfare state type that automatically
corresponds to a particular political economy. Instead, a number of different
welfare state regimes may 'fi t' together with the other components of a
nation's political economy. 40 Thus, a voluntary fringe benefits system like that
in the USA is an integral part of a broader liberal political economy, and is
a critical part of a strategy of competition based on rock-bottom prices and
low skills/low labou r costs because it allows firms the freedom to not provide benefits. Of course, it also creates difficulties for other firms who must
40

Put another way, there may be more 'varieties of capitalism' than the literature commonly assumes. The varieties of capitalism literature sketches only two models of capitalism:
coordinated and liberal market economies. And it is only beginning to systematicaUy integrate
welfare states into its analysis. For examples of the varieties of capitalism literature, see Crouch
and Streeck 1997; Hall 1998. For efforts to integrate the welfare state into varieties of
capitalism models, see Ebbinghaus and Manow 1998; and Manow 1997a.
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subsidize their compatriots' free-riding. The danger is that free-riding will
gradually undermine this form of social provision, as more and more employers drop coverage to contain their labour costs.
But a tax-financed, state-administered system like the British NHS can
be equally compatible with company strategies to compete on low prices
and labour costs characteristic of a liberal political economy. Indeed, one
reason that a social democratic oasis like the NHS could survive in Britain's
neoliberal desert- aside from its track record of delive~g low health care
spending and its broad political popularity- was precisely because it did
not threaten a competitiveness strategy premissed on low price and labour
costs that Thatcher and employers advocated. A social insurance system
like Germany's would seemingly pose the biggest disadvantage for firms
seeking competitiveness through lower labour costs. Yet, as we have seen,
employers have not been eager to part with their role in the social insurance
system because it has provided them a lever over labour costs outside of
collective bargaining.41 This is a considerable advantage in a political economy
that features a strong union presence in both industrial relations and in
welfare state administration.
Third, some of the arguments advanced in welfare state reform debates
argue for a roll-back of government and more privatization. But the health
care reform experiences show that employment-based fringe benefits systems
are a poor substitute for statutory social insurance programmes. As EspingAndersen (1990) has noted, different welfare state regimes embody different kinds of social rights. In statutory universal systems, social rights are
broadly defined and firmly anchored in the law. In fringe benefits systems,
however, social rights rest on a precarious foundation. They depend on the
economic power of unions to secure them through collective bargaining or
on the discretion of employers to provide them, and generally do not have
the legal backing of the state. This is not to imply that universal, statutory
programmes are immutable or permanent, or that they should not or cannot adapt to new realities. But they may be harder to dislodge because they
have a broader spectrum of the population interested in preserving them.
And because they incorporate redistribution within their design, they may
prove better able to adapt in ways that safeguard equity.
The task for all advanced industrialized societies is to adapt their welfare
states to new economic and demographic challenges in ways that reconcile
efficiency with equity. However, the outcome is likely to be quite different in
welfare states with different kinds of social rights and social forces. Private
41

Mares (1997a) and Swenson (1997) likewise found that firms have good economic reasons
for wanting universal social programmes. Employers may also value their administrative
role in social insurance if it provides them with a painless way to rationalize production
and shed unneeded labour onto the broader risk community (see Manow l 997a; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997).
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, fringe benefits systems appear to have a .bleak future. Lacking countervailing
forces to challenge or curb employers' freedom to pursue exit options, the
anchoring of social rights in the law, or a broad notion of solidarity that
ties people to a common ·fate, such systems wiH likely to continue down
the path of desolidarity, unless those bearing the brunt of cost-shifting and
economic adjustment can muster the political clout to seek .a negotiated
solution that advances equity alongside austerity.
· The outcomes may be more hopeful in universal, statutory systems. If,
as seems likely, economic and demographic pressures continue to strain
the finances and generosity of such welfare states, then governments and
employers will be hard-pressed to seek solutions that redefine solidarit¥ and
the content of social rights. But given the presence of powerful countervailing
forces in such welfare states and reform politics, successful adjustment will
hinge on forging a consensus with these stakeholders over a new conception
of solidarity that continues to ensure broad provision, spreads the burden
of adjustment fairly, and shelters the most vulnerable from harm.
There is no reason to expect countries to converge on a common path of
welfare state adjustment. There are several possible options.42 Each country's
outcome will depend not only on past 'policy legacies' (Pierson 1993b; Weir
and Skocpol 1985), but also on political choice and the particular settlements that stakeholders are able to forge among themselves.
42

Future choices in health care reforms- and how they are viewed- will depend o n the
particular problems facing each type of health care system and the specific politics of reform
in each country. For example, countries with universal health care provision might decide to
adopt a defined benefits package that is mandatory, universal , and comprehensive, but that
explicitly spells out the services that the national programme wiJJ cover. Individuals with
the means to do so could then purchase extra benefits at an additional charge, but the most
vulnerable would still have a right to fairly comprehensive coverage. Such a remedy, however, would officially sanction some differences in access based on ability to pay and may
imply a stricter delineation of medical necessity. British and German citizens might view this
solution either as a violation of solidarity, or as an attempt to redefine it to reconcile eq uity
and cost containment goals. But if' the USA adopted a defined benefits package as part of
national health insurance, it would clearly signal a reversal of desolidarity. See Brown ( 1998)
for a discussion of different health care reform options that European countries are contemplating or have recently ad opted. See Advisory Council for Concerted Actjon in H ealth
Care (1995, 1997) for a discussion of reform options for Germany. On redefining medical
necessity to fit new policy goals, see Charles et al. (1997).

